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1963] RECENT CASES 469
Allowing recovery in circumstances analogous to the
instant case would extend potential recovery out of logical
proportion. Eventually such a rule would extend to mere
bystanders.
LYNN GARRET-I
HOMICIDE - FELONY - MURDER RULE - CO-FELON
KILLED BY ROBBERY VICTIM-The defendants (Austin and
Bell) and the deceased, Rowe, agreed to commit an armed
robbery. During the attempted perpetration of the crime,
the intended robbery victim shot and killed Rowe. The
defendants were charged with first degree murder but were
granted a motion to quash the information on the theory
that Rowe's death was a justifiable homicide, and therefore
no murder was committed. The Michigan Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court in a 5-2 decision. People v. Austin,
370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W.2d 766 (1963).
At Common Law to be convicted of murder the killing
had to fall into one of two categories: (1) an unlawful
killing of another with malice aforethought, express or
implied;' or (2) a killing which falls within the terms of
the felony-murder rule.2  The basis of this rule is that in
the commission of a dangerous felony the perpetrator should
foresee a possible death since he invites dangerous re-
sistance. 3
The vast majority of jurisdictions have adopted some
statutory form of the common law felony-murder rule.
4
The Michigan statute5 is similar to other states. Generally
1. Commonwealth v. Buzard, 365 Pa. 511, 76 A.2d 394 (1950); 4 BLACK-
STONE'S COMMENTARIES 195 (Lewis' ed. 1897).
2. See PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 36 (1957). The felony-murder rule
is stated as follows: "Homicide is murder if the death ensues in conse-
quence of the perpetration or attempted perpetration of some other felony
unless such other felony was not dangerous of itself and the method of
it perpetration or attempt did not appear to involve any appreciable hu-
man risk."
3. See Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947)
(dictum).
4. See Arent and MacDonald, The Felony-Murder Doctrine And Its AP-
plication Under The New York Statutes, 20 Cornell L. Q. 288, 294 (1934-35)
for a complete survey of state statutes.
5. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316 (1948). "All murder . . . which shall be
committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape,
robbery or burglary, shall be murder of the first degree; . . .
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they differ only as to which felonies are included within the
rule.'
The majority of the states hold that in order to convict
under the felony-murder doctrine, the killing must have been
done by the defendant or by one acting in furtherance of
the felonious undertaking.7  Pennsylvania followed this
rules until the Moyer decision in 1947 when they extended
the doctrine to include any death which could be attributed
to the chain of events set in motion by the felon even though
he may not have fired the fatal shot.9  This causation
theory was later supported when a robber was convicted of
murder in a fatal shooting of a policeman by his fellow
officer." In 1955 Pennsylvania, in a fact situation identical
to the instant case, held the defense of justifiable homicide
did not bar the court from convicting the felon for murder.1
Three years later the Thomas case was considered an un-
warranted extension of the felony - murder rule and
Pennsylvania declared that the defense of justifiable homicide
by the actual killer prevents the robber from being tried
for murder. 2
Prior to the Redline decision both Michigan 13 and
California 14 had adopted Pennsylvania's causation theory
concerning the felony-murder rule. However, Michigan in
reaching its decision in the instant case relied on Redline as
the best interpretation of the felony-murder rule.' 5  Cali-
fornia has not had further litigation since the Redline decision,
but the writer submits that they will also discontinue their
present trend of over-extending the felony-murder rule.
Apparently North Dakota has not had any litigation in
6. See Michigan statute supra note 5. A sampling of similar statutes
differing only in the crimes included are Cal. Pen. Code Ann. § 189 (1955.)
(adds mayhem); N.D. Cent. Code § 12-27-12 (1960) (adds mayhem and sod-
omy); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4701 (Purdon 1963) (adds kidnapping).
7. E.g., Butler v. People, 125 Ill. 641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888); State v. Majors,
237 S.W. 486 (Mo. 1922); State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568 (1924).
8. Commonwealth v. Guida, 341 Pa. 305, 19 A.2d 98 (1941); Common-
wealth v. Major, 198 Pa. 290, 47 At]. 741 (1901).
9. Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947). (The gas
station proprietor shot and killed his employee while attempting to pre-
vent a robbery).
10. Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
11. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
12. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958). (Thc.
co-felon was killed by the police rather than by the robbery victim).
13. People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952).
14. People v. Wilburn, 314 P.2d 590 (Calif. 1957).
15. People v. Austin, 120 N.W.2d 766 at 775 (1963).
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point with the present case, but it is the writer's submission
they will follow the present law in Pennsylvania and Michigan.
The end result of the Austin case would seem to bring
the Michigan application of felony-murder back in line with
the majority rule that the killing must be done by the
defendant or someone acting in concert with him, and to
limit its application to those situations which caused such a
doctrine to be developed in the first place.
DAVID J. LANDBERG
SALES - IMPLIED WARRANTY-CIGARETTE-CANCER PROBLEM
- The decedent's widow and the administrator of his estate
brought an action for death allegedly caused by using
defendant's cigarettes. In U. S. District Court there was a
judgment for defendant. Their decision was conditionally
affirmed by the U. S. Court of Appeals; 1 subject to a statutory
certification procedure to determine the applicable state
law. 2  The Supreme Court of Florida held, two justices dis-
senting, that there was imposed on the defendant absolute
liability for breach of an implied warranty of fitness; even
though the plaintiff contracted cancer when it was not
foreseeable that cigarettes might be the cause. Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
Early in the 19th century an implied warranty of quality
was established on the theory that a purchaser has a right
to expect a saleable article when there is no opportunity for
inspection. 3  By 1911 strict liability respecting unwholesome
food products was established and has since been recognized
in most jurisdictions. 4  This strict liability has been given
1. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1963).
2. Fla. Stat. Ann § 25.031 (1945). Where there are no controlling pre-
cedents, the U. S. Supreme Court and federal appellate courts may certify
to the state Supreme Court for an interpretation of the law.
3. See Gardiner v. Gray,t4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (1815); Halcombe
v. Hewson, 2 Camp. 391, 170 Eng. Rep. 1194 (1810); See generally Prosser,
The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 117, 120
(1943).
4. Doyle v. Fuerst & Kraemer, 129 La. 838, 56 So. 906 (1911); See
Prosser, The AssaUlt Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 Yale L. J. 1099, 1107-1108 (1960). Seventeen states extend strict liability
without regard to negligence and privity. Five states have reached the
same result by statute. There is no definite North Dakota law on the sub-
ject.
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